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Supreme Court, U. S.

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IN THE

Supreme Court of the United States

OCTOBER TERM, 1978

No. 78-.....

BERTRAM L. PODELL,

Petitioner,

—v.—

THE JOINT BAR ASSOCIATION GRIEVANCE COMMITTEE
FOR THE SECOND AND ELEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICTS,

Respondent.

**PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE
COURT OF APPEALS OF THE
STATE OF NEW YORK**

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THE JOINT BAR ASSOCIATION GRIEVANCE COMMITTEE
FOR THE SECOND AND ELEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICTS,

Respondent.

Opinions Below

There was no opinion below.

The New York Court of Appeals, by its order entered October 19, 1978, denied petitioner's motion for leave to appeal to that court from an order of the Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of the State of New York, Second Judicial Department, entered March 13, 1978. No opinion accompanied that order of the New York Court of Appeals. The order of the New York Court of Appeals is reported at 45 NY 2d 711, and is reproduced in the Appendix.

The order of the Appellate Division, Second Department, entered March 13, 1978, referred to above, was also not accompanied by an opinion. It was accompanied by a decision slip. The order and decision slip are reported at 61 AD 2d 1019, and are reproduced in the Appendix.

On June 16, 1978, the Appellate Division, Second Department, made an order denying petitioner's motion in that court for leave to appeal to the New York Court of Appeals.

That order was accompanied by a decision slip but not by an opinion. The order of June 16, 1978 is not reported. It is reproduced in the Appendix.

Jurisdiction

The order of the Court of Appeals of the State of New York, review of which is here sought, was entered October 19, 1978. The jurisdiction of this Court rests on 28 U.S.C. 2101.

Questions Presented

1. Did the retroactive, automatic disbarment of petitioner, a New York attorney-at-law, without the possibility of judicial consideration or action, by the action of subsection 4 of Section 90 of the Judiciary Law of New York, as retroactively interpreted and applied by the New York Court of Appeals decision in *Matter of Chu*, 42 NY2d 490 (1977), violate the prohibition against *ex post facto* laws contained in Art. I, Section 10 of the Constitution of the United States and deprive petitioner of valuable rights in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment of the Constitution of the United States?

2. Is subsection 4 of Section 90 of the Judiciary Law of New York, which legislatively mandates the automatic disbarment of a New York attorney-at-law upon his conviction of a felony, without the possibility of any judicial consideration or action, and by reason of which petitioner was disbarred by the State of New York, a bill of attainder violative of Art. I, Section 10 of the Constitution of the United States?

3. Did the action of the Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of the State of New York, Second Judicial Department, in performing the ministerial act of striking petitioner's name from the roll of attorneys pursuant to subsection 4 of Section 90 of the Judiciary Law of the State of New York violate petitioner's rights under Art. I, Section 10 and the Fourteenth Amendment of the Constitution of the United States?

Statute Involved

The statute which this case involves is subsection 4 of Section 90 of the Judiciary Law of New York, which may be found at 29, Sections 1-499, McKinney's *Consolidated Laws of New York* 120, and which reads as follows:

"4. Any person being an attorney and counsellor-at-law, who shall be convicted of a felony, shall, upon such conviction, cease to be an attorney and counsellor-at-law, or to be competent to practice law as such.

"Whenever any attorney and counsellor-at-law shall be convicted of a felony, there may be presented to the appellate division of the supreme court a certified or exemplified copy of the judgment of such conviction, and thereupon the name of the person so convicted shall, by order of the court, be struck from the roll of attorneys."

Statement of the Case

Petitioner Bertram L. Podell was admitted to the Bar of the State of New York by the Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of the State of New York, Second Judicial Department, on December 14, 1949.

On July 12, 1973, petitioner was indicted in the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York. Count 1 of the indictment charged that petitioner, while a Member of Congress from Brooklyn, from March 1968 to the date of the indictment, conspired to defraud the United States and its agencies by influencing several such agencies in the performance of their duties in connection with the awarding of routes for air travel, in violation of 18 U.S.C. 371. Count 5 of the indictment charged conflict of interest in the period from December 1968 to September 1970 in that he allegedly attempted to influence United States agencies in favor of a client while he was a Member of Congress, in violation of 18 U.S.C. 203 (a) (2).

On January 9, 1975, petitioner pleaded guilty to those portions of Counts 1 and 5 of the indictment which charged him with conspiracy to commit a conflict of interest and conflict of interest, in that, while serving as a Congressman, he received a legal fee for advocating the interests of an airline before various federal agencies. He was convicted on that plea. The conviction was affirmed on appeal, *United States v. Podell*, 519 F 2d 144 (2d Cir. 1975), *certiorari den.*, 423 U.S. 926 (1975).

Both offenses of which petitioner was convicted were felonies under federal law.

As a result of his conviction, petitioner became subject to professional discipline as a New York attorney.

At the time the judgment of conviction was entered, October 21, 1974, and now, there were and are two New York statutes governing attorney-discipline, to wit: subsections 2 and 4 of Section 90 of the Judiciary Law of New York (hereinafter referred to as Judiciary Law 90.2 and Judiciary Law 90.4).

Judiciary Law 90.2 reads in relevant part as follows:

"2. The supreme court shall have power and control over attorneys and counsellors-at-law and all persons practicing or assuming to practice law, and the appellate division of the supreme court in each department is authorized to censure, suspend from practice or remove from office any attorney and counsellor-at-law admitted to practice who is guilty of professional misconduct, malpractice, fraud, deceit, crime or misdemeanor, or any conduct prejudicial to the administration of justice . . . " 29, Sections 1-499 McKinney's *Consolidated Laws of New York* 119.

Discipline under Judiciary Law 90.2 is subject to the provisions of subsection 6 of Section 90 of the Judiciary Law (Judiciary Law 90.6), which reads in relevant part as follows:

"6. Before an attorney or counsellor-at-law is suspended or removed as prescribed in this section, a copy of the charges against him must be delivered to him personally within or without the state, or, in case it is established to the satisfaction of the presiding justice of the appellate division of the supreme court to which the charges have been presented, that he cannot with due diligence be served personally, the same may be served upon him by mail, publication or otherwise as the said presiding justice may direct, and he must be allowed an opportunity of being heard in his defense." McKinney, *op. cit.* 120.

The procedure for disciplining an attorney under Judiciary Law 90.2, which is also governed by Part 691 of the Rules of the Appellate Division, Second Department, may be described as follows.

The Joint Bar Association Grievance Committee for the Second and Eleventh Judicial Districts (hereinafter called the Grievance Committee) would institute a proceeding in the Appellate Division, Second Department, by serving and filing a petition charging specified acts of professional misconduct by the attorney involved and asking the court to impose such discipline as to it appeared proper. The attorney involved would have the opportunity to file a reply. The court would then make an order appointing a referee to take testimony as to the charges and to report the same with his opinion to the court.

Hearings would then be held before the referee at which both sides would have the opportunity to present evidence and cross-examine each other's witnesses, after which the referee would make his report to the court. The court would then make an order (presumably) confirming the report of the referee and imposing discipline. The discipline could be either censure, suspension from practice for such period as the court determined and specified in its order, or disbarment. Of course, the referee might find the charges not sustained and the court might then dismiss them.

An attorney suspended by such an order had the right to apply for reinstatement after the expiration of the period of suspension; if he were ordered disbarred, he had the right to apply for reinstatement after seven years. His reinstatement would rest in the unrestricted discretion of the court.

Judiciary Law 90.4, the other statute governing attorney discipline, referred to above, is set out as the Statute Involved above.

It has long been the law in New York that disbarment under Judiciary Law 90.4 is an automatic result of the statute and requires no court consideration or action. As the New York Court of Appeals said in *Matter of Barash*, 20 NY 2d 154, 157 (1967), disbarment under Judiciary Law 90.4 is automatic and "no further action, judicial or otherwise, is required to constitute the fact . . ."

As a result, an attorney subject to Judiciary Law 90.4 never receives any "notice" of his disbarment, and he is disbarred as of the date of his conviction without having had the opportunity to present evidence on his own behalf, whether as to the nature of his wrongful conduct, going to mitigation, bearing on his past record or on his present character and fitness to practice law, or bearing on the extent of the penalty to be imposed. In fact, no court, nor any other body, gives any consideration to the extent of the penalty to be imposed; disbarment is the automatic result of the statute.

Such being the case, the action of the court under Judiciary Law 90.4 in striking the attorney's name from the rolls is purely a mandatory, ministerial act. As the Appellate Division, First Department said recently in *Matter of Sugarman*, 64 AD2d 166 (1st Dept. 1978):

"The termination of membership in the Bar by reason of the attorney's conviction of a felony differs from disbarment by order of this court [under Judiciary Law 90.2] in that the court does not disbar an attorney convicted of a felony. The statute renders him ineligible to continue as a member of the Bar; this court merely records the fact that the convicted attorney is no longer a member of the Bar."

Until a statutory amendment which was signed into law December 7, 1978, the consequence is that an attorney disbarred by operation of Judiciary Law 90.4 is disbarred for life; no New York court has the power to, and no New York court can or will, reinstate his license and right to practice law, no matter how much time has passed, no matter how he has conducted himself, and no matter what his character and fitness may be. *Matter of Sugarman, supra*. As the New York Court of Appeals said in *Matter of Donegan*, 282 NY 285, 292 (1940), the effect of Judiciary Law 90.4 is "automatic and irrevocable disbarment for life . . . a consequence most severe [which] partakes of the nature of punishment."

The statute signed into law December 7, 1978 amended subsection 5 of Section 90 of the Judiciary Law of New York so that that subsection now reads:

"Upon a reversal of the conviction for felony of an attorney and counsellor-at-law, or pardon by the president of the United States or governor of this or another state of the United States, *or if during a period of seven years after such removal or debarment, the attorney and counsellor-at-law has not been convicted of a crime*, the appellate division shall have power to vacate or modify such order of debarment." (Matter in italics added by amendment).

It is uncertain at this time whether the amendment applies to attorneys who were disbarred by the automatic operation of Judiciary Law 90.4, and it is equally uncertain, if it does, whether it applies to those so disbarred prior to the effective date of the amendment (as was petitioner). It must also be noted that, while the discretion of the court to reinstate an attorney disbarred under Judici-

ary Law 90.2 is unrestricted, the amendment permits such discretion to be exercised as to attorneys disbarred by Judiciary Law 90.4 only if they have not been convicted of any crime during the seven year period after disbarment.

At the time of petitioner's conviction January 9, 1975, the operation of Judiciary Law 90.4 was controlled by the holding of the New York Court of Appeals in the 1940 case of *Matter of Donegan, supra*. *Donegan* established that, if any attorney was convicted in federal court of a federal felony, he was not subject to the operation of Judiciary Law 90.4 unless the federal felony of which he was convicted found its precise counterpart among the statutory felonies set out in the Penal Law of New York.

The acts of which petitioner was convicted are, as stated above, classified as felonies under federal law. However, they are not crimes, neither misdemeanors, nor felonies, under New York law. The comparable conflict-of-interest statutes in New York are Sections 73 and 74 of the Public Officers Law which govern the ethical conduct of members of the State Legislature. Neither Section proscribes the acceptance of a legal fee by a legislator for representing a private party before state agencies. The only provision of these Sections remotely comparable to the federal statutes under which petitioner was convicted is subdivision 2 of Section 73 which prohibits state legislators from accepting or agreeing to accept compensation for services rendered before any state agency "whereby his compensation is to be dependent or contingent upon any action by such agency . . ." (emphasis added). There has never been, nor could there be, any allegation in the criminal or disciplinary proceedings that petitioner received a legal fee which was "dependent or contingent" upon any action by federal agencies. Non-contingent legal fees are specif-

ically allowed under subdivision 2 of Section 73 which states:

" . . . [N]othing in this subdivision shall be deemed to prohibit the fixing at any time of fees based upon the reasonable value of the services rendered."

Therefore, under the rule in *Donegan*, petitioner was not subject to the operation of Judiciary Law 90.4 and was not disbarred by and at the time of his conviction.

However, petitioner had been found guilty of a crime and, therefore, although not subject to Judiciary Law 90.4, he was subject to Judiciary Law 90.2.

As a result, the Grievance Committee started a proceeding against petitioner under Judiciary Law 90.2 by serving upon him and filing with the Appellate Division, Second Department, a petition under Judiciary Law 90.2 charging that he had conspired to engage in a conflict of interest and had committed a conflict of interest, alleging that those acts constituted professional misconduct, and asking the court to impose discipline upon petitioner. Petitioner filed an answer to the petition in which he denied that he was guilty of professional misconduct and asked the court to dismiss the charges against him.

On February 7, 1977, the court made an order, in accordance with the procedure outlined above, appointing Hon. Daniel G. Albert, a justice of the Supreme Court of the State of New York, to hear and report, with his findings.

The nature of the evidence which the referee was obliged to receive in a case, such as petitioner's, involving conviction of a federal felony which was not a felony under New York law, is described in *Matter of Levy*, 37 NY 2d 279, 281-2 (1975), as follows:

"While the issue of guilt may not be relitigated, the attorney may, of course, introduce any competent evidence by means of which to explain or mitigate the significance of his criminal conviction . . . any proof which is reasonably relevant to the ultimate issues—the character of the offense committed and the nature of the penalty, if any, to be imposed . . . Thus, there should be received any competent proof which will assist the Appellate Division in the discharge of its difficult and delicate responsibility of determining what sanction, if any be appropriate, will best serve the public interest and at the same time assure the particular attorney full due process and fairness in recognition of the substantial interest that is his in his right to practice law."

Hearings were held before the referee on May 9 and 10, 1977, at which petitioner appeared in person and by counsel, witnesses testified and were cross-examined, and documentary evidence was introduced. A record of 386 pages was made. The hearing before the referee complied, of course, with the rule of *Matter of Levy*.

On July 28, 1977, Justice Albert made and filed his referee's report. His conclusions are fairly summarized by the following quotation from the report:

"While the crimes involved herein are no doubt serious as indicated above,* the evidence demonstrated that they were not of such a heinous nature as to involve a high degree of moral turpitude. . . .

"The evidence showed that respondent enjoys an exemplary family life and that throughout his adult career

* All federal felonies were denominated "serious crimes" under the Rules of the Appellate Division, Second Department.

has devoted a large part thereof to charitable endeavors. Nor can the Court overlook respondent's previously unblemished career in politics and at the bar. In 1954, respondent was elected to the New York State Assembly where he served for 14 years prior to his election to the Congress in 1968. Respondent enjoyed a distinguished legislative career and has never been publicly or privately disciplined for misconduct as an attorney. Moreover, there was an abundance of evidence received by the Court, well over forty (40) character letters and affidavits from every branch of government, legislative, executive and judicial, attesting to respondent's high character and reputation as an honorable individual and as an able and ethical attorney.

"The Court, pursuant to the order of reference, makes the following findings:

"...

"That while the crimes are serious within the meaning of the rules of the Appellate Division, Second Department, they do not involve moral turpitude.

"The record demonstrates that respondent did not commit a crime of venality but rather was unable to distinguish between his role as a Congressman and that of a private attorney, and as a result thereof, violated the federal conflict of interest laws.

"Respondent has had a long and honorable record of public and community service and is very highly regarded and respected in legal and civic circles and by his many colleagues in both legislative houses in which

he served since 1954, the New York State Assembly and the United States House of Representatives.

"In this Court's opinion this respondent has been amply punished for the only misdeed he has ever been shown to have committed in his official career and should not be deprived of continuing the only means he has left to him of making a livelihood for himself and his family—namely, the practice of law.

"This Court finds that the crime for which the respondent pled guilty, namely, conflict of interest, although serious in nature, was not of such a magnitude as to justify further punishment beyond that already meted out to the respondent [approximately four and one-half months in a federal correctional institution]; nor does this Court find that if permitted to practice the law, that anything has been shown by the petitioner to lead this Court to believe that this respondent would not or could not ably and competently represent clients in an ethical and honorable manner."

As will be seen, the court never acted upon the referee's report and it is impossible to say with certainty what action it would have taken with respect to petitioner had it acted upon it. However, there are a sufficient number of cases in New York involving discipline for conviction of federal crimes not New York felonies to permit the conclusion that, had the court acted upon the referee's report, petitioner would have had a good chance to have the charges dismissed, or, had the court not dismissed the charges, to be censured or to be suspended from practice for a short period. It can be said with fair certainty that he would not have been disbarred.

The following are some examples of the actions of the New York courts in cases involving convictions for federal crimes which were not felonies under New York law:

Charges dismissed—Matter of Anonymous No. 1, 45 AD 2d 88 (1st Dept. 1973), appeal dismissed, 34 NY 2d 517 (1974); *Matter of Anonymous No. 2*, 45 AD 2d 89 (1st Dept. 1974), motion for leave to appeal denied, 34 NY 2d 517, appeal dismissed, 34 NY 2d 961 (1974)

Censure—Matter of Schner, 278 App. Div. 138 (1st Dept. 1951); *Burke v. New York State Bar Ass'n*, 55 AD 2d 988 (3rd Dept. 1977)

Six month suspension—Matter of Ginsberg, 253 App. Div. 197 (1st Dept. 1938)

One year suspension—Matter of Zipkin, 249 App. Div. 100 (1st Dept. 1936)

Two year suspension—Matter of Mahan, 237 App. Div. 664 (1st Dept. 1933)

By a notice of motion dated October 26, 1977, petitioner moved in the Appellate Division, Second Department, for an order confirming the referee's report and dismissing the charges against him.

On October 13, 1977, just prior to the date when petitioner made his said motion to confirm the referee's report, the New York Court of Appeals decided *Matter of Chu*, *supra*, 42 NY2d 490 (1977). As it turned out, on the basis of *Matter of Chu*, the State of New York completely changed the rules affecting petitioner in the middle of the game.

By *Chu*, the New York Court of Appeals repealed and nullified its decision in *Matter of Donegan, supra*. In *Chu*,

the court ruled that the felonies covered by Judiciary Law 90.4 did, in fact, include every federal felony, whether it was comparable to a New York Penal Law felony or not.

Any doubts as to the scope of *Chu*, generated by the somewhat ambiguous language of the opinion therein, were removed by the New York Court of Appeals in its decision in *Matter of Thies*, 45 NY2d 865 (1978). In *Thies*, however, three of the seven judges filed a vigorous dissenting memorandum containing the following (45 NY2d at 867):

"This inflexibly harsh rule needlessly rejects the principle that firm discipline can be achieved without sacrificing fairness and reason (see concurring opinion, *Matter of Chu*, 42 NY2d 490, 495). The aberrational [sic] results which today's determination will bring may now be avoided only by legislative action."

Commenting on these dissenting views, the majority in *Thies* said (45 NY2d at 866):

"If as [the dissenters] urge, consideration should be given to the gravity of the offense and to mitigating circumstances, on principle this would seem to be equally true with respect to convictions for New York felonies. Yet, as the dissenters recognize, the validity of the concept of automatic disbarment as applied to New York felonies has long been upheld."*

The Grievance Committee answered petitioner's motion to confirm the referee's report and dismiss the charges

* Neither the United States Supreme Court, nor any lower federal court, has ever considered the constitutionality of Judiciary Law 90.4. In fact, the New York Court of Appeals has never given serious consideration to the question.

against him by an order to show cause of November 2, 1977 which directed petitioner to show cause why his name should not be stricken from the roll of attorneys on the ground that he had automatically been disbarred at the time of his conviction under Judiciary Law 90.4. In the affidavit which it submitted in support of the order to show cause, the Grievance Committee said:

"Under the rationale of *Matter of Chu*, respondent having been convicted of [federal] felony crimes, was automatically disbarred under Judiciary Law, Section 90, Subdivision (4); the findings of the referee are, therefore, irrelevant and cannot be considered by this Court."

Faced by this order to show cause, New York, acting through its courts, had two alternatives as to how *Chu* was to be given effect: one, New York could have made it applicable only to felonies committed after *Chu* was decided, or to convictions after that date; or, two, New York could have made it applicable to all convictions for federal felonies, including those convictions which occurred prior to the date *Chu* was decided, during the period when *Donegan* was in effect. If the second alternative was chosen, then the nature of the penalty for federal felony convictions ante-dating *Chu* would be retroactively changed by *Chu*.

In opposition to the order to show cause, petitioner submitted a Memorandum of Law in which it was argued, among other points made, that if *Chu* were applied retro-

actively to petitioner it would violate the constitutional prohibition against *ex post facto* laws.

The Appellate Division, Second Department, decided the matter by its order of March 13, 1978, based upon its decision slip theretofore filed. The order was not accompanied by an opinion. It contained the following:

"ORDERED that, effective March 13, 1978, the name of the respondent Bertram L. Podell is hereby struck from the Roll of Attorneys and Counselors-at-law by virtue of said conviction (*Matter of Chu*, 42 NY2d 490). . . ."

The order and decision slip are reproduced in the Appendix. As far as can be determined from the order and decision slip, the Appellate Division, Second Department, gave no consideration to the constitutional argument raised by petitioner.

By the order, New York applied *Chu* retroactively to petitioner, thus depriving him of the right to have the court consider the matters in mitigation and explanation which had been presented to the referee and based upon which the referee had in effect recommended to the court that the charges be dismissed; eliminating the possibility, a very strong one in his case, of a dismissal of the charges, or censure, or a suspension; and mandating his automatic, possibly life-time, disbarment as of the time of his conviction.

Petitioner thereupon moved in the Appellate Division, Second Department, for leave to appeal to the New York Court of Appeals pursuant to Section 5602 of the New York Civil Practice Law and Rules. In support of the motion, petitioner urged on the court his claim that his

rights under the United States Constitution had been violated by the court's order of March 13, 1978, which claim should be reviewed by the New York Court of Appeals.

The Appellate Division, Second Department, denied petitioner's motion for leave to appeal to the New York Court of Appeals by its order of June 16, 1978, which was once again accompanied by a decision slip but not by an opinion. The order and decision slip are reproduced in the Appendix. Again, there is no evidence that the court gave any consideration to petitioner's claims under the United States Constitution.

Thereafter, petitioner moved in the New York Court of Appeals pursuant to the same section of the Civil Practice Law and Rules for leave to appeal the Appellate Division, Second Department, order of March 13, 1978 to the New York Court of Appeals. Among the reasons urged on the court in support of the motion was petitioner's claim that the action of the Appellate Division, Second Department, violated petitioner's rights under the United States Constitution.

The New York Court of Appeals denied petitioner's motion for leave to appeal by its order of October 19, 1978, which is reproduced in the Appendix. There was no opinion and there is no evidence that the New York Court of Appeals gave any consideration to petitioner's claim under the United States Constitution.

The order of the New York Court of Appeals of October 19, 1978 terminated the proceeding in the New York courts and is the final action of which petitioner seeks review here.

REASON FOR GRANTING THE WRIT

Section 90.4 of the Judiciary Law of New York, on its Face and as Applied to Petitioner, Grossly Violates Art. I, Section 10 and the Fourteenth Amendment of the Constitution of the United States in a Manner Which, Since It Involves the Relationship between Courts and Their Officers, Attorneys-at-Law, Strikes at the Administration of Justice. The State Courts Decided These Substantial Federal Questions in a Way Not in Accord with Applicable Decisions of This Court.

1. The disbarment of petitioner by Judiciary Law 90.4 deprived him of his constitutionally protected interest in his right to practice law without due process of law in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment as interpreted by authoritative decisions of the United States Supreme Court.

a. The ex post facto effect of Matter of Chu violated petitioner's due process rights.

Petitioner was brought to trial under Judiciary Law 90.2 and the trier of facts, the referee, had determined in effect that whatever offense petitioner may have committed, no penalty should be imposed upon him because of the evidence in explanation and mitigation which had been received. Under New York law as it stood at the time the offense was committed and at the time of the trial, the court might then have imposed no penalty, or it might have censured petitioner, or it might have suspended him for a short period. All these options were open.

The law was then changed by *Matter of Chu*. *Chu* determined that the offense which petitioner had committed was a felony under Judiciary Law 90.4 and that petitioner

had therefore been automatically disbarred, perhaps for his life-time, at the time of his conviction. Thus, the possibility of the dismissal of the charges and all the lesser penalties which could have been imposed were eliminated by the change in the law which, in petitioner's case, occurred after he was tried.

No more dramatic example of an *ex post facto* effect could be conceived.

In *Fletcher v. Peck*, 10 U.S. (6 Cranch.) 87, 3 L. Ed. 162, 178 (1810), this Court said that an *ex post facto* law is one "which renders an act punishable in a manner in which it was not punishable when it was committed."

This was repeated in *Cummings v. Missouri*, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 277, 18 L. Ed. 356, 364 (1867), where the Court described an *ex post facto* law as one which imposed an "additional punishment to that prescribed when the act was committed." To the same effect, see: *Ex parte Garland*, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 333, 18 L. Ed. 366, 370 (1867); *Burgess v. Salmon*, 97 U.S. 381 (1878); *Thompson v. Utah*, 170 U.S. 343, 351 (1898), where the Court said that an *ex post facto* law is one which "alters the situation of the accused to his disadvantage"; and *Bowie v. City of Columbia*, 378 U.S. 347, 353-54 (1964), where the Court had the following to say:

"[A]n unforeseeable judicial enlargement of a criminal statute, applied retroactively, operates precisely like an *ex post facto* law, such as Art. I, § 10, of the Constitution forbids . . ."

In *Ross v. State of Oregon*, 227 U.S. 150 (1913), this Court ruled that the prohibition in Art. I, Sections 9 and 10 of the Constitution does not apply to changed judicial

interpretations of statutes, only to statutes. As said in *James v. United States*, 366 U.S. 213, 224 (1961):

"[T]he *ex post facto* provision of the Constitution has not ordinarily been thought to apply to judicial legislation."

But the pernicious effect of increasing a penalty retroactively is of the same dimension whether the increase is brought about by statute or by "judicial legislation." And, therefore, the possible evil was recognized and eliminated by the Court, which has held that judicial legislation which, *ex post facto*, "alters the situation of the accused to his disadvantage" and imposes an additional penalty upon him, although not barred by Art. I, Section 9 or 10, is nevertheless a deprivation of due process barred by the Fourteenth Amendment. The principle was expressed in the foregoing quotation from *Bowie v. City of Columbia*, with the following addition:

"If a state legislature is barred by the *Ex Post Facto* Clause from passing such a law, it must follow that a State Supreme Court is barred by the Due Process Clause from achieving precisely the same result by judicial construction."

The principle was followed in *Marks v. United States*, 430 U.S. 189 (1977).

The statute retroactively modified by *Matter of Chu*, Judiciary Law 90.4, is not a criminal statute. However, that fact does not change the result.

For due process purposes, an attorney threatened with the penalty or punishment of disbarment because of his conviction of a felony is entitled in this area to the same

due process as a person being tried in a criminal court for a crime. "[T]he power of the States to control the practice of law cannot be exercised so as to abrogate federally protected rights." *Johnson v. Avery*, 393 U.S. 483, 490 n.11 (1969). In *Erdmann v. Stevens*, 458 F.2d 1205, 1209-10 (2d Cir. 1972), the court said:

"[A] court's disciplinary proceedings against a member of the bar is comparable to a criminal rather than a civil proceeding . . . it cannot be disputed that for most attorneys the license to practice law represents their livelihood, the loss of which may be a greater punishment than a monetary fine. See *Bradley v. Fisher*, 80 U.S. [13 Wall.] 335, 355, 20 L. Ed. 646 (1872); *Spevack v. Klein*, 385 U.S. 511, 516, 87 S. Ct. 625, 17 L. Ed. 2d 574 (1967). Furthermore, disciplinary measures against an attorney, while posing a threat of incarceration only in cases of contempt, may threaten another serious punishment—loss of professional reputation. The stigma of such a loss can harm the lawyer in his community and in his client relations as well as adversely affect his ability to carry out his professional functions, particularly if his branch of the law is trial practice. Undoubtedly these factors played a part in leading the Supreme Court to characterize disbarment proceedings as being 'of a quasi-criminal nature.' In *re Ruffalo*, 390 U.S. 544, 551, 88 S. Ct. 1222, 20 L. Ed. 2d 117 (1968)."

In *Ex parte Garland*, *supra*, the statute involved was not a criminal statute but one on all fours with Judiciary Law 90.4. It was a July 24, 1865 Congressional enactment which, in effect, disbarred, *ex post facto*, attorneys who had aided the Confederacy. The Court held that the statute violated Art. I, Section 9.

It is clear, therefore, that the retroactive application to petitioner of the *Chu* interpretation of Judiciary Law 90.4, thus removing petitioner's safeguards under Judiciary Law 90.2 and increasing the penalty to which he was subject, violated petitioner's Fourteenth Amendment rights as established by the decisions of this Court.

b. Judiciary Law 90.4 on its face violates the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.

The automatic disbarment of an attorney upon his conviction of a felony is an arbitrary atavism having no place in our law today. It violates every ordinary conception and instinct as to due process and fairness.

It imposes a grievous, automatic punishment upon an attorney without any inquiry or action by the court which admitted him to practice and of which he is an officer. This has been fully discussed above.

It unthinkingly imposes a penalty which has no necessary relationship to the offense committed.

There are all kinds of crimes bearing the statutory label of "felony" of various degrees of turpitude, and there are all kinds of circumstances, mitigating the turpitude involved, in which felonies can be committed.

Highlighting the illogicality and arbitrariness of the statute is the fact that, until *Chu*, most federal conspiracy convictions were not felonies under the statute, no matter what the venality or turpitude involved, nor was tax fraud within the statute. Attorneys convicted of such federal felonies received penalties from the New York courts ranging from censure, to suspension for varying periods, to disbarment.

By Section 265.05 of the Penal Law of New York, it is a felony to possess a firearm and ammunition outside one's

home or place of business. An attorney could violate that section for the most venal motives. But he could also violate it for motives that might be considered praiseworthy: for example, to protect a loved one from an imminent threat of death or injury, there being neither the time nor the means to ward off the threat in any other way.

Similarly, the convicted attorney might be one with a long record of misconduct, indicating an incorrigibly bad character, or he might be one with a long record of honorable service at the Bar, an exemplary private life, selfless public service, and an outstanding reputation (as the referee found petitioner to be).

But, under Judiciary Law 90.4, regardless of the nature or circumstances of the crime, regardless of the motive, and regardless of the character and past record of the attorney involved, without any judicial inquiry or consideration, judgment or action, the convicted attorney would be summarily and automatically disbarred.

This type of brutal and unreasoning arbitrariness is, in fact, one of the reasons why bills of attainder are proscribed.* The proscription of bills of attainder is part of the Constitution as originally adopted; the Fifth Amendment guarantee of due process and of course the Fourteenth Amendment, were adopted later. But any legislative proscription, any bill of attainder, must also be considered a violation of due process, precisely because it prevents any judicial inquiry into the nature and circumstances of the crime and into matters in explanation and mitigation.

* The bill of attainder question is discussed in the next section of this petition.

The revulsion inspired by the type of arbitrary proscription imposed by Judiciary Law 90.4, and the recognition of the necessity for judicial inquiry, evidence in mitigation and explanation, and a reasoned judicial fitting of the penalty to the offense, runs like a red thread through all of the authorities.

Thus, according to Henry Drinker, in his classic *Legal Ethics* (1963 ed., p. 49):

"When a lawyer is disbarred it is because the court has concluded after thoroughly investigating and considering the charges against him, as well as his explanation of them and his past record as a lawyer and a citizen . . . that he is not one who should be a member of this honorable profession."

One of the factors which motivated this Court, in *Cummings v. Missouri, supra*, in concluding that the automatic defrocking of a priest (or disbarment of an attorney) because he had rendered aid to the Confederacy was impermissibly arbitrary was this: that one might have rendered aid to the Confederacy for different motives—for example, out of love and loyalty to a father; and similar considerations moved the Court in *Ex parte Garland, supra*, to insist that a lawyer can be disbarred only "by the judgment of the court".

In *Randall v. Brigham*, 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 523, 540, 19 L. Ed. 285 (1869), the Court said that disciplinary proceedings required "that . . . notice should be given to the attorney, of the charges made, and an opportunity afforded him for explanation and defense."

In *Schware v. Board of Bar Examiners*, 353 U.S. 232, 246 (1957), the Court ruled that a state could not prevent the

admission of an applicant to the Bar (which is no different in principle from disbarring an attorney already admitted) except on the basis of evidence sufficient "to raise substantial doubts about his *present* good moral character" (emphasis added), "a record which rationally justifies a finding that [he] was morally unfit to practice law." In that case, the Court also said (353 U.S. at 239 n.5):

"We need not enter into a discussion of whether the practice of law is a 'right' or a 'privilege'. Regardless of how the State's grant of permission to engage in this occupation is characterized, it is sufficient to say that a person cannot be prevented from practicing except for valid reasons. Certainly the practice of law is not a matter of the State's grace."

In the companion case of *Konigsberg v. State Bar*, 353 U.S. 252, 273 (1956), the Court said:

"[T]here is no evidence in the record which rationally justifies a finding that Konigsberg failed to establish good moral character . . ."

Mr. Justice Frankfurter, in his concurring opinion in *Schwartz*, expressed the rule of the case as follows (353 U.S. at 249):

"Refusal to allow a man to qualify himself for the profession on a wholly arbitrary standard or on a consideration which offends the dictates of reason offends the Due Process Clause."

In *In re Ruffalo*, 390 U.S. 544, 550 (1968), the Court said:

"Disbarment, designed to protect the public, is a punishment or penalty imposed on the lawyer. *Ex parte Gar-*

land, 4 Wall. 333, 380; *Spevack v. Klein*, 385 U.S. 511, 515. He is accordingly entitled to procedural due process, which includes fair notice of the charge."

In sum, "the power of the State to control the practice of law cannot be exercised so as to abrogate federally protected rights." *Johnson v. Avery, supra*.

In *Erdmann v. Stevens, supra*, 458 F.2d at 1212, the court said that the New York Court of Appeals "may not uphold a finding of misconduct on the part of an attorney unless it concludes that 'no substantial legal right of the accused has been violated.'"

"The ultimate issues [in a disciplinary matter are] the character of the offense committed and the nature of the penalty, if any, appropriately to be imposed." *Matter of Levy, supra*, 37 NY 2d at 282.

It is necessary to conclude from the foregoing and from the authorities cited in previous sections of this petition, that an attorney is entitled to a hearing before the court at which he has the opportunity to present evidence in mitigation and explanation, and to have the penalty, if any is to be imposed, determined by the court in the light of the evidence, and that the imposed absence of any of these pre-requisites violates due process. Judiciary Law 90.4 imposes the absence of all of these pre-requisites.

There is no reason, therefore, for surprise at the strong language of the minority in *Matter of Thies, supra*, 45 NY 2d at 867, to the effect that Judiciary Law 90.4 is an "inflexibly harsh rule [which sacrifices] fairness and reason", one which brings about "aberrational [sic] results".

Two federal cases deal directly with the question whether automatic disbarment upon conviction of crime without a

hearing and without the fitting of the penalty to the offense violates due process. In both cases the courts concluded that it did. *Matter of Ming*, 469 F 2d 1352 (7th Cir. 1972) and *Matter of Jones*, 506 F 2d 527 (8th Cir. 1974).

In *Ming*, the United States District Court had summarily suspended Ming from practicing before it without a hearing because of his conviction for failure to file federal income tax returns. Ming appealed and the Seventh Circuit reversed the order of the District Court, holding that automatic suspension, without a hearing and without consideration of matters in mitigation and explanation, violated due process. The court said (469 F 2d at 1354):

"As an initial matter, we would not conceive that every Tom, Dick and Harry of a misdemeanor would serve as a basis for suspension. Secondarily, but conceivably of genuine significance, there is the matter of the duration of the suspension. Extenuating circumstances tending toward a minimization of the penalty very probably would require a hearing for proper development. Recently, in a case of parole revocation, the Supreme Court held that the parolee had the right to a hearing, with minimum due process requirements, including the opportunity to be heard in person and to confront and cross-examine adverse witnesses, *Morrissey v. Brewer*, 408 U.S. 471, 92 Sup. Ct. 2593, 33 L. Ed. 2d 484 (1972). While in a hearing based on a finalized conviction of a misdemeanor, an attorney may not be allowed to reargue the merits of the conviction, he would seem to have similar interests to those of the parolee, or a person being sentenced for a crime, to some hearing under due process. In such a situation, 'a chance to respond' must be equated to 'the opportunity to be heard' which necessarily implies a hearing.

Appellant was not afforded such a hearing and we find that this denial was a deprivation of due process of law."

In *Jones*, the Chief Judge of the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Arkansas made an order striking Jones' name from the list of attorneys of that court upon Jones' conviction in that court of filing false income tax returns, a felony. The Chief Judge acted summarily and without any notice or hearing under a local rule, similar to Judiciary Law 90.4, that one convicted of a felony "shall ipso facto be disbarred." Jones appealed and the Eighth Circuit reversed, again on the ground that the lack of any hearing violated due process. The court said (506 F 2d at 529):

"[W]e remand the case with instructions that Jones be permitted to present any evidence of mitigation, etc., that he desires. In the event the trial judge feels, after a hearing, that the mitigating circumstances are so compelling that disbarment was not appropriate, he may then amend his judgment by ordering suspension or such other penalty as is deemed appropriate under the circumstances."

Finally, the following two circumstances must be noted.

This Court, the United States Supreme Court, has no rule similar to Judiciary Law 90.4. No matter what the offense of the attorney may be, he is, under Part II, Section 8, of the Rules, given a hearing at which evidence in mitigation and explanation may be presented.

New York State has no statute barring convicted felons from admission to the Bar. The matter is left in the hands

of the Appellate Division, which grants or denies admission based upon the whole record as to character and fitness. As a result, a flexible rule is followed. See: American Bar Association, Commission on Correctional Facilities and Services, *Results of a Survey Inquiring into State Board of Bar Examiners Policies Relating to Admission of Ex-Offenders*. The various departments of the Appellate Division consider the circumstances surrounding the conviction, the type of felony, the time elapsed since the conviction, and the applicant's behavior since the conviction. In fact, according to the survey, there has been only one convicted felon who has applied for admission to the New York Bar, and he was admitted. The fact that New York will, in proper circumstances, admit a convicted felon to the practice of law, underlines the due process defect of Judiciary Law 90.4.

To the extent that *Hawker v. New York*, 170 U.S. 189 (1879) and *Ex parte Wall*, 107 U.S. 265 (1882) are to the contrary, and it is believed that properly read they are not, they do not reflect present realities, they cannot be reconciled with the extensive authority here marshalled, and they should not be followed.

In conclusion, Judiciary Law 90.4 contravenes the frequently expressed views of this Court, is a gross violation of due process, and should be stricken down as a violation of the Fourteenth Amendment.

2. Judiciary Law 90.4 is a bill of attainder which violates Art. I, Section 10 of the United States Constitution.

In *Cummings v. Missouri*, *supra*, this Court defined a bill of attainder as "a legislative act which inflicts punishment without judicial trial." Eighty years later, the Court described bills of attainder as follows:

"[L]egislative acts . . . that apply either to named individuals or easily ascertainable members of a group in such a way as to inflict punishment on them without a judicial trial are bills of attainder prohibited by the Constitution." *United States v. Lovett*, 328 U.S. 303, 315 (1946).

Judiciary Law 90.4 meets every requirement of the definition since it is a legislative act which inflicts a grievous punishment without a trial and without any judicial consideration or action.

There can be no doubt that the automatic disbarment for life imposed by Judiciary Law 90.4 is a punishment.

"Any deprivation or suspension [of the right to practice a profession] is punishment, and can in no other-wise be defined." *Cummings v. Missouri*, *supra*, 18 L. Ed. at 362.

"[E]xclusion from any of the professions . . . can be regarded in no other light than as punishment . . ." *Ex parte Garland*, *supra*, 18 L. Ed. at 370 (1867).

In *Spevack v. Klein*, 385 U.S. 511, 514 (1966), the Court spoke of "the dishonor of disbarment and the deprivation of a livelihood" resulting from it.

In *Erdmann v. Stevens*, 458 F 2d 1205, 1210 (2d Cir. 1972), the court said:

"[F]or most attorneys the license to practice law represents their livelihood, the loss of which may be a greater punishment than a mandatory fine. See *Bradley v. Fisher*, 80 U.S. [13 Wall.] 335, 355, 20 L. Ed. 646 (1872) . . ."

The New York Court of Appeals has expressed the same view. "[D]isbarment . . . [is] a consequence most severe [which] partakes of the nature of punishment." *Matter of Donegan*, *supra*, 282 NY at 292. Disbarment is a "penalty" for professional misconduct and deprives the attorney "of the substantial interest that is his in his right to practice law." *Matter of Levy*, *supra*.

Similarly, "permanent proscription from any opportunity to serve the Government is punishment, and of a most severe type". *United States v. Lovett*, *supra*, 328 U.S. at 316. And deprivation of the right to hold union office is a punishment. *United States v. Brown*, 381 U.S. 437 (1965). In both *Lovett* and *Brown*, the classification of the consequence as punishment was made in connection with holdings that the legislation in question was a bill of attainder.

The Court has expressed its view that a basic purpose, in our political structure, for the proscription against bills of attainder, is the necessity of guaranteeing the constitutional separation of powers, it being the function of the courts, not the legislature, to prescribe punishments for offenses. The proscription is "a general safeguard against legislative exercise of the judicial function, or more simply—trial by legislature." *United States v. Brown*, *supra*, 381 U.S. at 442. Nowhere is this consideration of more conse-

quence than the area of attorney discipline. Attorneys, being court officers, and not creatures of the legislature, may be subjected to discipline only by the court, after judicial inquiry and judgment, and not by legislative fiat. Any other rule would strike at the heart of the separation of powers and the independent judiciary. As stated by this Court in *Cummings v. Missouri*, *supra*, 18 L. Ed. at 370:

"The profession of an attorney and counselor is not like an office created by an act of Congress . . . They are officers of the court: admitted as such by its order, upon evidence of their possessing sufficient legal learning and fair private character . . . The order of admission is the judgment of the court that the parties possess the requisite qualifications as attorneys and counselors, and are entitled to appear as such and conduct causes therein. From its entry the parties become officers of the court and are responsible to it for professional misconduct. They hold their office during good behavior, and can only be deprived of it for misconduct ascertained and declared by the judgment of the court after opportunity to be heard has been afforded . . . Their admission or their exclusion is not the exercise of a mere ministerial power. It is the exercise of judicial power, and has been so held in numerous cases."

The Court repeated these views in *Ex parte Garland*, *supra*, saying there that an attorney does not hold his office by "grace or favor" and can be disbarred only "by the judgment of the court, for moral or professional delinquency." 71 U.S. at 379.

Once again, this time after 105 years, another federal court used almost the same language. "The court alone

admits an applicant to practice before it. Thereupon he becomes an officer of the court. The power to discipline . . . rests exclusively with the court." *Erdmann v. Stevens, supra*, 458 F 2d at 1209.

The American Bar Association Special Committee on Evaluation of Disciplinary Enforcement, in its *Problems and Recommendations in Disciplinary Enforcement (Final Draft, June 1970)*, pp. 13 et seq., expressed the same view, speaking of the court's "exclusive jurisdiction" to supervise the Bar "without or *despite* contrary legislative action." (Emphasis added).

This being so, the fiat of the New York legislature in prescribing automatic disbarment upon conviction of a felony is a patent bill of attainder, in violation of the United States Constitution. It is a violation which strikes at the separation of powers and undermines the independence and integrity of the courts, of the court-attorney relationship, and of the administration of justice, of which this Court should take cognizance.

It is also a gross injustice to the attorney involved here, because it has deprived him of the right, which is his as an officer of the court, to have the court consider his professional history and his character and fitness, as well as the nature of his offense, and impose a penalty properly fitted to the case. The discussion, in the Statement of the Case, above, of the variety of the penalties imposed by the New York courts for the same offense after they have reviewed all the circumstances, underlines the injustice to petitioner here.

3. The action of the New York courts in striking petitioner's name from the roll of New York attorneys violated petitioner's rights of due process under the Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States.

The sole constitutional justification for the action of the New York courts in striking petitioner's name from the roll of New York attorneys was petitioner's automatic disbarment by reason of Judiciary Law 90.4 as interpreted by *Matter of Chu, supra*. Since, as has been demonstrated above, that disbarment was constitutionally invalid, the order striking petitioner's name from the rolls had no constitutional justification and violated petitioner's Fourteenth Amendment rights of due process.

CONCLUSION

For the reasons stated above, this petition for certiorari should be granted.

Respectfully submitted,

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Of counsel

APPENDIX

Court of Appeals Order of October 19, 1978

**STATE OF NEW YORK
COURT OF APPEALS**

At a session of the Court, held at Court of
Appeals Hall in the City of Albany on the
nineteenth day of October A. D. 1978.

Present,

HON. CHARLES D. BREITEL,
Chief Judge, presiding.

Mo. No. 830

**In the Matter of BERTRAM L. PODELL, an Attorney and
Counselor-at-Law.**

THE JOINT BAR ASSOCIATION GRIEVANCE COMMITTEE &C.,
Respondent,

BERTRAM L. PODELL,
Appellant.

A motion for leave to appeal to the Court of Appeals
in the above cause having heretofore been made upon the
part of the appellant herein and papers having been sub-
mitted thereon and due deliberation having been thereupon
had, it is

ORDERED, that the said motion be and the same hereby is
denied.

/s/ JOSEPH W. BELLACOSA
Clerk of the Court

Appellate Division Order of March 13, 1978

At a Term of the Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of the State of New York, Second Judicial Department, held in Kings County on March 13, 1978.

Present,

HON. JAMES D. HOPKINS,
Justice Presiding,
HON. HENRY J. LATHAM,
HON. SAMUEL RABIN,
HON. J. IRWIN SHAPIRO,
Associate Justices.

In the Matter of BERTRAM L. PODELL, an attorney and counselor-at-law.

THE JOINT BAR ASSOCIATION GRIEVANCE COMMITTEE FOR
THE SECOND AND ELEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICTS,
Petitioner,
BERTRAM L. PODELL,
Respondent.

A disciplinary proceeding having been instituted in this court upon the petition of The Joint Bar Association Grievance Committee for the Second and Eleventh Judicial Districts, with respect to Bertram L. Podell, an attorney and counselor-at-law, who was admitted to practice by this court on December 14, 1949; the petition praying that the respondent be disciplined for professional misconduct upon

the charges therein set forth; the proceeding having come on before this court by a notice of petition, dated November 9, 1976; and the respondent having filed an answer thereto; and this court by an order, dated February 7, 1977, having referred the issues raised by the petition and the answer to HON. ALBERT G. ALBERT, a Justice of the Supreme Court, to hear and to report, with his findings upon each of the issues; thereafter, the said HON. ALBERT G. ALBERT, having held hearings and filed his report with this court on August 1, 1977, together with a transcript of the hearings; and the respondent having moved, by a notice of motion dated October 26, 1977, (1) to confirm the Referee's findings and recommendations and to dismiss the proceeding against him, or in the alternative, (2) to dismiss the proceeding on constitutional grounds (i.e., deprivation of due process and equal protection of the law); and the petitioner having cross moved, by an order to show cause dated November 2, 1977, (1) to vacate this court's order dated February 6, 1975 which authorized the institution of this proceeding; and (2) to strike the respondent's name from the roll of attorneys on the ground that he has been disbarred by virtue of a felony conviction (violation of US Code, tit. 18, § 371—conspiracy to defraud the United States Government and US Code, tit. 18, § 203 [a] and 2—conflict of interest) in the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York on January 9, 1975;

Now, on reading and filing respondent's said notice of motion, the affidavit of John G. Bonomi and the memorandum in support of the said motion; the petitioner's said order to show cause, the affidavit of Nicholas C. Cooper and the memorandum in support of petitioner's cross motion; the respondent's memorandum in opposition to the cross motion and the petitioner's memorandum in reply

thereto; and John G. Bonomi, Esq., having appeared of counsel for the respondent and Nicholas C. Cooper, Esq., having appeared of counsel for the petitioner, due deliberation having been had thereon; and upon this court's decision slip heretofore filed and made a part hereof, it is unanimously

ORDERED that the respondent's motion is hereby denied, and it is further

ORDERED that the petitioner's cross motion is hereby granted, and it is further

ORDERED that this court's said order, dated February 6, 1975, which authorized the proceeding and, on the court's own motion, its said order dated February 7, 1977, which referred the issues to a Referee are both recalled and vacated, and it is further

ORDERED that, effective March 13, 1978, the name of the respondent Bertram L. Podell is hereby struck from the Roll of Attorneys and Counselors-at-law by virtue of said conviction (*Matter of Chu*, 42 NY2d 490), and it is further

ORDERED that, pursuant to Statute (Judiciary Law, § 90), the said Bertram L. Podell is hereby commanded to desist and refrain (1) from the practice of the law in any form, either as principal, or as agent, clerk or employee of another; (2) from appearing as an attorney or counselor-at-law before any judge, justice, board, commission or other public authority; (3) from giving another an opinion as to the law or its application or any advice in relation thereto; and (4) from holding himself out in any way as an attorney and counselor-at-law, and it is further

ORDERED and DIRECTED that the said Bertram L. Podell shall comply with this court's rules governing the conduct of disbarred, suspended or resigned attorneys—a copy of such rules being annexed hereto and made a part hereof.

Enter:

IRVING N. SELKIN
Clerk of the Appellate Division.

SUPREME COURT

APPELLATE DIVISION—SECOND JUDICIAL DEPARTMENT

691.10 Conduct of disbarred, suspended or resigned attorneys. (a) Compliance with Judiciary Law. Disbarred, suspended or resigned attorneys at law shall comply fully and completely with the letter and spirit of sections 478, 479, 484 and 486 of the Judiciary Law relating to practicing as attorneys at law without being admitted and registered, and soliciting of business on behalf of an attorney at law and the practice of law by an attorney who has been disbarred, suspended or convicted of a felony.

(b) Compensation. A disbarred, suspended or resigned attorney may not share in any fee for legal services performed by another attorney during the period of his removal from the bar. A disbarred, suspended or resigned attorney may be compensated on a quantum meruit basis for legal services rendered and disbursements incurred by him prior to the effective date of the disbarment or suspension order or of his resignation. The amount and manner of payment of such compensation and recoverable disbursements shall be fixed by the court on the application of either the disbarred, suspended or resigned attorney or the new attorney, on notice of the other as well as on notice to the client. Such applications shall be made at special term in the court wherein the action is pending or at special term in the Supreme Court in the county wherein the moving attorney maintains his office if an action has not been commenced. In no event shall the combined legal fees exceed the amount the client would have been required to pay had no substitution of attorneys been required.

(c) Notice to clients not involved in litigation. A disbarred, suspended or resigned attorney shall promptly notify by registered or certified mail, return receipt requested, all clients being represented in pending matters, other than litigated or administrative matters or proceedings pending in any court or agency, of his disbarment, suspension or resignation and his consequent inability to act as an attorney after the effective date of his disbarment, suspension or resignation and shall advise said clients to seek legal advice elsewhere.

(d) Notice to clients involved in litigation. (1) A disbarred, suspended or resigned attorney shall promptly notify, by registered or certified mail, return receipt requested, each of his clients who is involved in litigated matters or administrative proceedings, and the attorney or attorneys for each adverse party in such matter or proceeding, of his disbarment, suspension or resignation and consequent inability to act as an attorney after the effective date of his disbarment, suspension or resignation. The notice to be given to the client shall advise of the prompt substitution of another attorney or attorneys in his place.

(2) In the event the client does not obtain substitute counsel before the effective date of the disbarment, suspension or resignation, it shall be the responsibility of the disbarred, suspended or resigned attorney to move pro se in the court in which the action is pending, or before the body in which an administrative proceeding is pending, for leave to withdraw from the action or proceeding.

(3) The notice given to the attorney or attorneys for an adverse party shall state the place of residence of the client of the disbarred, suspended or resigned attorney. In addi-

tion, notice shall be given in like manner to the Office of Court Administration of the State of New York in each case in which a retainer statement has been filed.

(e) Conduct after entry of order. The disbarred, suspended or resigned attorney, after entry of the disbarment or suspension order or after entry of the order accepting the resignation, shall not accept any new retainer or engage in any new case or legal matter of any nature as attorney for another. However, during the period between the entry date of the order and its effective date he may wind up and complete, on behalf of any client, all matters which were pending on the entry date.

(f) Filing proof of compliance and attorney's address. Within 10 days after the effective date of the disbarment or suspension order or the order accepting the resignation, the disbarred, suspended or resigned attorney shall file with the clerk of the Appellate Division for the second judicial department an affidavit showing:

(1) that he has fully complied with the provisions of the order and with these rules; and

(2) that he has served a copy of such affidavit upon the petitioner or moving party.

Such affidavit shall also set forth the residence or other address of the disbarred, suspended or resigned attorney where communications may be directed to him.

(g) Appointment of attorney to protect clients' interests and interests of disbarred, suspended or resigned attorney. Whenever it shall be brought to the court's attention that a disbarred, suspended or resigned attorney shall have failed or may fail to comply with the provisions of subdivisions (c), (d) or (f) of this section, this court, upon

such notice to such attorney as this court may direct, may appoint an attorney or attorneys to inventory the files of the disbarred, suspended or resigned attorney and to take such action as seems indicated to protect the interests of his clients and for the protection of the interests of the disbarred, suspended or resigned attorney.

(h) Disclosure of information. Any attorney so appointed by this court shall not be permitted to disclose any information contained in any file so inventoried without the consent of the client to whom such file relates except as necessary to carry out the order of this court which appointed the attorney to make such inventory.

(i) Fixation of compensation. This court may fix the compensation to be paid to any attorney appointed by it under this section. The compensation may be directed by this court to be paid as an incident to the costs of the proceeding in which the charges are incurred and shall be charged in accordance with law.

(j) Required records. A disbarred, suspended or resigned attorney shall keep and maintain records of the various steps taken by him under this Part so that, upon any subsequent proceeding instituted by or against him, proof of compliance with this Part and with the disbarment or suspension order or with the order accepting the resignation will be available.

Appellate Division Order of June 16, 1978

At a Term of the Appellate Division of the
Supreme Court of the State of New York,
Second Judicial Department, held in
Kings County on June 16, 1978.

HON. JAMES D. HOPKINS,
Justice Presiding,
HON. HENRY J. LATHAM,
HON. SAMUEL RABIN,
HON. J. IRWIN SHAPIRO,
Associate Justices.

IN THE MATTER OF

BERTRAM L. PODELL, an attorney and counselor-at-law.

THE JOINT BAR ASSOCIATION GRIEVANCE COMMITTEE FOR THE
SECOND AND ELEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICTS,

Petitioner,
BERTRAM L. PODELL,
Respondent.

In the above disciplinary proceeding, this court, by an order dated March 13, 1978, having ordered, *inter alia*, that the respondent's name be struck from the Roll of Attorneys and Counselors-at-Law; and the respondent having moved, by a notice of motion dated April 27, 1978, for leave to appeal to the Court of Appeals from the said order dated March 13, 1978;

Now, upon reading and filing the said notice of motion, the affidavit of John G. Bonomi and the exhibits annexed thereto and respondent's memorandum of law in support of the said motion and the affidavit of Nicholas C. Cooper in opposition thereto; and upon all the papers filed herein; and John G. Bonomi, Esq., having appeared of counsel for the respondent and Nicholas C. Cooper, Esq., having appeared of counsel for the petitioner, due deliberation having been had thereon; and upon this court's decision slip heretofore filed and made a part hereof, it is

ORDERED that the said motion is hereby denied.

Enter:

IRVING N. SELKIN
Clerk of the Appellate Division

No. 2620

IN THE MATTER OF

BERTRAM L. PODELL, an attorney and counselor-at-law.

THE JOINT BAR ASSOCIATION GRIEVANCE COMMITTEE FOR THE
SECOND AND ELEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICTS, *petitioner*;
BERTRAM L. PODELL, *respondent*.

Motion by respondent for leave to appeal to the Court of Appeals from an order of this court, dated March 13, 1978, which, *inter alia*, ordered the clerk of this court to remove respondent's name from the roll of attorneys and counselors-at-law.

Motion denied.

HOPKINS, J.P., LATHAM, RABIN and SHAPIRO, JJ., concur.

June 16, 1978 IN RE PODELL, BERTRAM L. No. 2620
 (JOINT BAR ASSOC., GRIEV.
 COMM. SECOND AND ELEVENTH
 JUD. DISTR.)